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Ethics v. Professionalism and the Louisiana Supreme Court
N. Gregory Smith*
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'
This article is about some words. It is about "legal ethics" and "profession-
alism." These words figure prominently in a 1997 order of the Louisiana
Supreme Court dealing with mandatory continuing legal education. Prior to the
1997 order, most Louisiana lawyers were required to obtain fifteen hours of
continuing legal education credit each year, with one hour devoted to "legal
ethics, professional responsibility, and rules of conduct." This has now changed.
Most lawyers will still be required to obtain fifteen hours of credit, but one of
those hours must now concern "legal ethics," and one hour must now concern
"professionalism." This article considers the change and the meaning of the
words.
I. THE PERCEIVED DECLINE IN LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
A number of recent books,- articles,4 and bar association reports5 have
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1. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 75 (1962).
2. Some lawyers are exempt. These include members of Congress, members who are 65 or
older, lawyers in their first two years of practice, active duty members in the armed forces, federal
judges and magistrates, members who reside outside the state and who do not practice here, and
members who can show that compliance with the mandatory CLE requirements would work an undue
hardship by rason of sickness, disability, or other "clearly mitigating circumstances." La. Rules for
Continuing Legal Education 2 & 3.
3. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal
Profession is Transforming American Society (1994); Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer:
Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993); Sol M. Linowitz & Martin Mayer, The Betrayed
Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
4. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 Ind. L.J. 911 (1996);
John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing
Change, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 563 (1994); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 Tenn.
L. Rev. 1 (1993); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession,
68 St. John's L. Rev. 85 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Teaching and Learning Professionalism, Report of the Professionalism
Committee, American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (1996);
".. In the Spirit of Public Service: " A Blueprint for the Rekindling of .auyer Professionalism,
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concluded that there are serious problems with the American legal profession.
Many of them say that there has been a decline in professionalism. 6 A recent
report by the Professionalism Committee of the American Bar Association notes
that, although descriptions of "the causes and symptoms" of the decline "vary
greatly," there are several prevalent themes in the writings. These include a loss
of understanding of law practice as a "calling," economic changes that have
"converted law practice from a profession to a business," a "loss of civility," and
a "loss of a sense of the ultimate purpose of lawyers.."7 The committee
Report of the Commission on Professionalism, American Bar Association, reprinted in 112 F.R.D.
243 (1987) [hereinafter In the Spirit of Public Service].
6. But see Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism, " 41 Emory
LJ. 403, 432 (1992) ("[T]he truth of the matter is that lawyers today accept and honor the basic
values of professionalism as much as they ever have.").
Most of the illustrations that are offered to show departures from professionalism feature instances
of incivility, abusive conduct in litigation, and questionable advertisements by lawyers. See Roger
C. Cramton, On Giving Meaning to "Professionalism." in Teaching and Learning Professionalism,
Symposium Proceedings, at 9 (ABA 1997).
Lawyer incivility may have been the principal impetus for the generation of Louisiana's new CLE
rule. Shortly after the supreme court issued its order, the chair of the Committee on Professionalism
and Quality of Life wrote an article about the new rule, which stated:
Civility and professionalism are contagious, but so are incivility and unprofessional
conduct. Bar journals, legal periodicals and discussions with fellow practitioners reveal
that incivility and unprofessional conduct are far more pervasive problems than lawyer
incompetence or dishonesty. These same sources tell us that incivility and unprofessional
conduct have a greater impact on the practice of law, the reputation of the legal profession
and our quality of life than does a lack of knowledge or substantive legal issues or illegal
acts. Something must be done to curb iti
In an effort to promote civility and discourage unprofessional conduct, the Louisiana
State Bar Association's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee, the
Professionalism and Quality of Life Committee and the House of Delegates have
overwhelmingly endorsed a resolution asking the Louisiana Supreme Court to amend the
mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) requirements to require one hour of CLE on
professionalism. With the court's adoption of a mandatory hour of CLE on professional-
ism, Louisiana will join 20 other states in requiring more than one hour of CLE annually
on ethics and/or professionalism.
Frank X. Neuner, Jr., Mandatory Professionalism: A Cure for an Infectious Disease, 45 La. B.J. 18-
20 (1997).
7. Professionalism Committee, American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, Teaching and Learning Professionalism 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter Report].
The specific "themes" identified by the committee were:
I. the loss of an understanding of the practice of law as a "calling";
2. changes in the economics of the practice of law which have converted law practice
from a profession to a business-making it more difficult for lawyers to devote significant
amounts of time to public service activities and generating a growing sense of dissatisfac-
tion with law practice as being incompatible with personal values and goals;
3. perceived excesses of the adversarial process, including the loss of civility, permitted
by the existing rules governing litigation;
4. an undermining of the traditional independent counseling role of lawyers;
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concluded that "lawyer professionalism has declined in recent years and
increasing the level of professionalism will require significant changes in the way
professionalism ideals are taught and structural changes in the way law finms
operate and legal services are delivered." s The committee said this would not
be easy.'
Unsurprisingly, the committee had many recommendations for change. The
recommendations covered changes in undergraduate education,'0 law school
education," bar association endeavors,' 2 law firm behavior,1 3 and the judicial
5. concerns about the competency of lawyers and their compliance with applicable ethical
codes; and
6. the loss of a sense of the ultimate purpose of lawyers resulting from a change in the
traditional concept of lawyers serving the public good as the intermediaries between the
conflicting interests in our society.
Id.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. See id.
10. The committee recommended:
I. Each college or university should be encouraged to offer general or survey courses
involving ethical and value issues and basic principles of ethical decision-making.
2. Colleges and universities should be encouraged to adopt ethics courses specifically
designed for their various undergraduate programs.
3. Colleges and universities should be encouraged to increase the number of symposia,
lectureships, and similar programs which give specific attention to ethics and value issues.
Id. at 12.
11. The committee recommendations regarding law schools were:
1. Faculty must become more acutely aware of their significance as role model for law
students' perception of lawyering.
2. Greater emphasis needs to be given to the concept of law professors as role models
of lawyering in hiring and evaluating faculty.
3. Adoption of the pervasive method of teaching legal ethics and professionalism should
be seriously considered by every law school.
4. Every law school should develop an effective system for encouraging and monitoring
its ethics and professionalism programs.
S. The use of diverse teaching methods such as role playing, problems and case studies,
small groups and seminars, story-telling and interactive videos to teach ethics and
professionalism, should be encouraged.
6. Law book publishers should consider adopting a policy requiring that all new
casebooks and instructional materials incorporate ethical and professionalism issues. Law
book publishers should also publish more course-specific materials on legal ethics and
professionalism issues as part of new casebooks, new editions of old casebooks,
supplements to casebooks, compilations of supplemental readings, and compendiums.
7. Law schools need to develop more fully co-curricular activities, policies, and
infrastructures that reflect a genuine concern with professionalism.
Id. at 16-25.
12. The committee recommended the following with respect to bar associations:
National, state, local, and speciality bar associations must assume a leadership role in
defining and promoting professionalism ideals and in implementing professionalism
programs that reach all their members.
Id. at 27.
13. For law firms, the committee recommended:
19981 .
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role. " Two recommendations that are pertinent to the subject of this article
concern the role of the bar association and the role of judges. As to the first of
these, the committee recommended: "National, state, local, and specialty bar
associations must assume a leadership role in defining and promoting profession-
alism ideals and in implementing professionalism programs that reach all their
members." 5 As to the second, the committee recommended: "Judges and
judicial organizations must take a greater leadership role in raising the level of
professionalism among practicing lawyers."'"
If there has been a serious decline in professionalism among lawyers, it
seems appropriate enough for bar associations and judges to be involved in
efforts to reverse it. It is interesting, however, that the committee thought that
the bar association needs to be involved in "defining" professionalism ideals. If
those ideals require definition, how clear is it that professionalism is in decline?
In fact, there has been some dissent on this point.' 7 Of course, even if the few
dissenters are right, and professionalism may not be in decline, there could be
considerable virtue in trying to do better. But it would still be useful to come
up with a commonly-accepted definition of professionalism.
II. WHAT IS PROFESSIONALISM?
As it turns out, there is uncertainty about the meaning of "professionalism."
In a 1986 report, the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism
observed that "professionalism is an elastic concept the meaning and application
of which are hard to pin down."' Does this matter? Professor Roger Cramton
[i]. Practicing lawyers must become more acutely aware of the need to nurture and to
renew their professionalism ideas on a continuing basis, always aspiring to maintain the
highest standards of the lawyer-statesman paradigm.
[2]. Law firms should adopt standards of practice and risk management procedures that
enhance the level of competence and efficiency of all the lawyers in their law firm.
[3]. Practicing lawyers need to become more sensitive to important quality of life issues
and implement in their law firms enlightened working conditions that are compatible with
the personal as well as the professional goals of the firm's lawyers.
(4]. All law firms should have one or more committees that monitor the firm's
compliance with ethical rules, continuing legal education requirements, risk management
procedures, pro bono activities, quality of life, and other professionalism issues.
Id. at 31-33.
14. The committee recommended:
Judges and judicial organizations must take a greater leadership role in raising the level
of professionalism among practicing lawyers.
Id. at 33.
15. Id. at 27.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Not all commentators agree that professionalism is in decline. See Timothy P. Terrell &
James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism, " 41 Emory L.J. 403, 432 (1992) ("[T]he truth of
the matter is that lawyers today accept and honor the basic values of professionalism as much as they
ever have.").
18. In the Spirit of Public Service, supra note 5, at 261.
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thinks so. He has said: "[A]lithough everyone talks about professionalism as an
icon or goal of lawyering, no one has been able to define it in ways that others
could accept. The result is that bar pronouncements rely on abstractions of
immense generality-concepts so vague and uncertain that they lack the power
to guide lawyer conduct in particular situations or to motivate commitment by
a would-be believer."" This, he thinks, is a "critical problem." 0
There have been attempts at definition. For example, in its 1996 report, the
Professionalism Committee of the American Bar Association offered the
following: "A professional lawyer is an expert in law pursuing a learned art in
service to clients and in the spirit of public service; and engaging in these
pursuits as part of a common calling to promote justice and public good."'"
The committee also identified the following "essential characteristics of the
professional lawyer":
1. Learned knowledge
2. Skill in applying the applicable law to the factual context
3. Thoroughness of preparation
4. Practical and prudential wisdom
5. Ethical conduct and integrity
6. Dedication to justice and the public good.22
But even these characteristics suffer from vagueness. Again, in the words
of Professor Cramton: "[I]n today's world of moral relativism, deconstruction
and denial of foundational truth, it is not enough to be for 'justice' and 'the
public good' because they lack agreed-upon content."23
One of the challenges, then, when we speak of professionalism, is to give
some meaning to the expression. The Louisiana Supreme Court sought to do so
in its order of May 23, 1997.
III. THE MAY 23 ORDER
On May 23, 1997, the Louisiana Supreme Court entered an order that
requires Louisiana lawyers to include one hour of "professionalism" in their
fifteen hours of annual continuing legal education credits. The order also
requires Louisiana lawyers to obtain an hour of credit in "legal ethics." The
order represents a significant change in mandatory continuing legal education
requirements.
19. Cramton, supra note 6, at 8.
20. Id.
21. Report, supra note 7, at 6.
22. Id. at 6-7.
23. Cramton. supra note 6, at 13.
1998]
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A. The Old Rule
Mandatory continuing legal education came to Louisiana in the 1980's. At
the urging of the Louisiana Supreme Court, a Louisiana State Bar Association
task force drafted some continuing legal education rules that were subsequently
approved by the House of Delegates and by the Board of Governors. In the end,
the supreme court did not adopt the Bar Association's precise proposal, but it did
adopt a continuing legal education program that has been binding on Louisiana
lawyers since 1988.4 From the beginning, the scheme required lawyers to
obtain fifteen hours of annual CLE credit. And it further provided: "Of the
fifteen (15) hours of CLE required annually, not less than one of such hours shall
concern legal ethics, professional responsibility, and rules of conduct."2
. The old rule appears to have contemplated some differences among the
expressions "ethics," "professional responsibility," and "rules of conduct, '26 but
it did not specify what the differences were. However, a couple of the
regulations that were adopted in connection with the rule also referred to this
hourly obligation by a shorthand expression. They called it "the Ethics
requirement."" Lawyers and CLE providers tended to use the shorthand
expression as well.
B. The New Rule
I. Origins
The new rule appears to have had its origins in work by the State Bar
Committee on Professionalism and Quality of Life. In the fall of 1995, the
committee began to discuss the possibility of requiring a CLE hour in profession-
alism. Initially, the committee gave some thought to proposing that Louisiana
lawyers be required to obtain sixteen credit hours of continuing legal education
each year, with the additional hour to be on the subject of professionalism.2"
24. An Interview with LSBA President Wood Brown 11, 36 La. BJ. 81 (1988).
25. La. Rules for Continuing Legal Education 3(c). The rule was adopted effective January 1,
1988. Regulation 4.7, adopted in connection with the CLE rules, required the State Bar Association
to provide CLE courses at least once a year, and, among other things, provide coverage of:
Legal ethics, professional responsibility, rules ofconductgoverning attorneys, and opinions
thereon, including a summary of the most numerous violations of the disciplinary rules for
the past twelve months.
La. Rules for Continuing Legal Education, Reg. 4.7.
26. A similar distinction also appeared in one of the regulations on standards for CLE
programs: "The activity must deal primarily with matters related to the practice of law, professional
responsibility, or ethical obligations of attorneys." See La. Rules for Continuing Legal Education,
Reg. 4.1(b).
27. See La. Rules for Continuing Legal Education, Regs. 3.17, 3.18.
28. Telephone conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept. 18, 1997) (notes of conversation
on file with author). See the Minutes of the November 30, 1995 meeting of the Committee on
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However, in November 1995, the committee began to focus on a proposal
to designate one of the existing fifteen credit hours as a professionalism hour.29
A proposal along these lines was generated, but it did not enjoy the support of
the State Bar Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education." The
proposal was eventually "tabled" when it came before the State Bar's House of
Delegates in January 1996."'
After this initial failure, the Professionalism Committee began work on
another alternative: incorporating "professionalism" into the existing credit hour
for "ethics." This idea was supported by the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Committee as well, and a proposal to that effect was brought before
the Louisiana Supreme Court in August 1996.2 However, the supreme court
did not approve. It was apparently concerned that the proposal would result in
unfavorable dilution of the "ethics" hour."
3
Thereafter, the Professionalism Committee worked with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Committee on a further effort, one that was
reminiscent of the 1995 proposal. The two committees ended up co-sponsoring
a proposal that professionalism be given a separate credit hour, but that the
overall hourly credit requirement remain at fifteen. 4 The proposal went before
Professionalism and Quality of Life. Mr. Neuner was the chair of the Committee on Professionalism
and Quality of Life at the time the supreme court issued its May 23, 1997 order.
29. Id.
30. Telephone conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept. 18, 1997). Members of the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Committee were not opposed to professionalism as
such, but they were concerned about implementation problems. Telephone conversation with S. Guy
deLaup (Oct. 14, 1997) (notes of conversation on file with author). Mr. deLaup was the chair of the
MCLE Commnittee during 1995 and 1996.
The MCLE Committee had already noticed problems with the implementation of the then-existing
requirement for an annual credit hour in "legal ethics, professional responsibility, and rules of
conduct." Some Louisiana lawyers, particularly in rural areas of the state, were having trouble
getting their "ethics" hour, and the MCLE Committee staff was spending a considerable amount of
time dealing with requests for extensions and non-compliance issues. Members of the MCLE
Committee feared that compliance problems would be exacerbated if there were to be a second
dedicated hour of professionalism. Telephone conversation with S. Guy deLaup (Oct. 14,
1997).
31. Telephone conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept. 18, 1997). See the Minutes of
the January 31, 1996 meeting of the Committee on Professionalism and Quality of Life.
32. The language of the proposal sought to revise Rule 3(c) of the Rules for Continuing Legal
Education, as follows:
Of the fifteen (15) hours of CLE required annually, not less than one (I) of such hours
shall concern legal ethics or professionalism (hereafter collectively referred to as "Ethics
requirement").
See Memorandum from Kitty Hymel to Frank X. Neuner, Jr. and others (May 3, 1996). Ms. Hymel
is the Administrator of the Louisiana State Bar Association's mandatory CLE program.
33. Telephone conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept. 18, 1997). See the Minutes of
the October 16, 1996 meeting of the Professionalism and Quality of Life Committee and a letter of
July 23, 1996 from S. Guy deLaup to Frank X. Neuner, Jr.
34. Telephone conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept. 18, 1997). See Letter from Frank
X. Neuner, Jr., Chair of the Committee on Professionalism and Quality of Life, to the House of
1998]
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the House of Delegates in January 1997. After some discussion, and on a narrow
vote, the proposal was amended to incorporate a two-year trial period." The
House of Delegates thereafter approved the amended proposal.3" The proposal
then went before the supreme court. On May 23, 1997, the supreme court
entered its order requiring an hour of professionalism, but it dropped the two-
year trial period that had been recommended by the House of Delegates.37
2. Specifics of the New Rule
The May 23 order substantially amended Rule 3(c) of the Rules for
Continuing Legal Education. First, it added professionalism as a required CLE
topic: "Of the fifteen (15) hours of CLE required annually, not less than one (1)
of such hours shall concern legal ethics, and not less than one (1) of such hours
shall concern professionalism." 3'
Second, the order attempted to distinguish "legal ethics" from "professional-
ism":
Legal ethics concerns the standard of professional conduct and
responsibility required of a lawyer. It includes courses on professional
responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as
attorneys' fees, client development, law office economics, and practice
systems, except to the extent that professional responsibility is discussed
in connection with these topics.
Professionalism concerns the knowledge and skill of the law
faithfully employed in the service of client and public good, and entails
what is more broadly expected of attorneys. It includes courses on the
duties of attorneys to the judicial system, courts, public, clients, and
other attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations.
Legal ethics sets forth the standards of conduct required of a
lawyer; professionalism includes what is more broadly expected. The
professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to,
the legal ethics CLE requirement. 9
The court's effort to distinguish legal ethics from professionalism was not
confined to the changes in Rule 3(c). The court's order also dealt with the
Delegates (Jan. 8, 1997) (enclosing proposed Resolution of the Committee on Professionalism and
Quality of Life and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee).
35. See Minutes of the House of Delegates of the Louisiana State Bar Association, January 25,
1997, at 3.
36. See MCLE Requirement in Professionalism? Should "'Professionalism" be MCLE
Requirement?, 45 La. B.J. 17 (1997).
37. See id.
38. La. S. Ct. Order of May 23, 1997.
39. Id.
(Vol. 58
N. GREGORY SMITH
distinction in amendments to Regulation 4. 1(b) of the Rules for Continuing Legal
Education:
Topics eligible for CLE credit in satisfaction of the Ethics require-
ment include the independence of the lawyer in the context of the
lawyer-client relationship; conflict between duty to client and duty to
the system of justice; conflict in the duty to the client versus the duty
to the other lawyer; the responsibility of the lawyer to employ effective
client communication and relation skills to increase service to the client
and foster understanding of expectations of the representation; and other
programs involving disciplinary rules, rules of professional conduct, and
malpractice avoidance.
Topics eligible for CLE credit in satisfaction of the Professionalism
requirement include the lawyer's responsibility as an officer of the
court; the lawyer's responsibility to treat fellow lawyers, members of
the bench, and clients with respect and dignity; misuse and abuse of
discovery and litigation; the lawyer's responsibility to protect the image
of the profession; the lawyer's responsibility generally to the public
service; the lawyer's duty to be informed about methods of dispute
resolution and to counsel clients accordingly. 0
It seems clearenough that the Louisiana Supreme Court wants CLE providers
to offer, in the new required credit hour on professionalism, something other than
"Ethics, Part Two." So it labored, in the May 23 order, to distinguish the contents
of the two dedicated credit hours. In the process, the court defined "legal ethics"
in a rather odd fashion. At the same time, it defined "professionalism" in a way
that incorporates some topics from the traditional realm of legal ethics.
3. An Odd Definition of Legal Ethics
In one portion of its order, the court states that legal ethics includes "courses
on professional responsibility and malpractice." In isolation, this formulation of
legal ethics is extremely broad. "Professional responsibility" is not defined, but
it is an expression that might reasonablybe thought to be larger than, and inclusive
of, codified standards of lawyer conduct." Indeed, there is no compelling reason
40. Id. An earlier version of the "courses" included the "history, concept, theory and
philosophy of the legal profession," but these obviously did not survive. See Memorandum from
Kitty Hymel, Administrator of the Mandatory CLE program, to Frank X. Neuner, Jr., Chair of the
Committee on Professionalism and Quality of Life, and others (May 3, 1996). That is too bad.
Although the rejected list might seem a little "squishy" for a continuing legal education program, a
little focus on history and philosophy relating to the profession would help give meaning to
"professionalism."
41. In 1969, the American Bar Association issued its "Model Code of Professional
Responsibility." This included specific disciplinary rules as well as aspirational standards for
1998]
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to think, in the abstract, that "professional responsibility" should mean anything
vastly different than, say, "professionalism." But the court did not stop here. It
said that legal ethics also incorporates the idea of "legal malpractice." This is an
interesting inclusion. Malpractice is principally about the attorney's liability for
negligence, not about compliance with codes of conduct, or standards of morality,
as such. At this point in the court's order, we seem to have an extremely broad
notion of "legal ethics."
However, in the larger context of the May 23 order, it is apparent that the
supreme court's purpose is to give a rather narrow meaning to "legal ethics." In
the key portion of the order that contrasts legal ethics and professionalism, the
court says: "Legal ethics sets forth the standards of conduct required of a lawyer;
professionalism includes what is more broadly expected." Similarly, the court
says: "Legal ethics concerns the standard of professional conduct and responsibili-
ty required of a lawyer." The basic idea seems to be that "legal ethics" consists
of a collection of "required" duties. What are they? No doubt the collection
would include duties arising under the Rules of Professional Conduct that are
enforceable by formal discipline. The court also tells us that the collection
includes duties arising under malpractice law. Are there others? Perhaps the court
would include duties arising under specific statutes regulating lawyers 2 or duties
arising under ordinary rules of court.
Whatever is included, though, must be "required." Apparently the court is
talking about duties whose breach could result in some sanction. Such a concept
of legal ethics actually excludes some provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct,"3 offers little or nothing in the way of an aspirational reach, and
contains no hint of general moral obligation beyond minimal standards of conduct.
But it picks up malpractice liability. All in all, this is a rather odd conception of
legal ethics."
lawyers. The aspirational standards cover much of the ground that is sometimes accorded to
"professionalism."
42. Two such statutes come to mind. Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:217 (1988) provides for
liability of an attorney to a client if a nonsuit is entered against the client "owing to the absence or
neglect of the attorney without a reasonable cause." Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:219 (1988 &
Supp. 1997) sets forth criminal sanctions for an attorney who pays "money or give[s] any other thing
of value to any person for the purpose of obtaining representation of any client."
43. For example, Rule 6.1, which deals with pro bono service, is not mandatory. La. Rules
of Professional Conduct 6.1 (1988). It says that a lawyer "should render public interest legal
service." And Rule 2.1, on the lawyer's role as advisor, says that, in giving advice, "a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors." (emphasis supplied). La. Rules of Professional Conduct 2.1 (1988).
44. Which is not to say that this is the first time such a concept has surfaced. A similar
formulation shows up in the Georgia regulations on mandatory continuing legal education:
(3) Legal Ethics. Legal ethics includes instruction on professional responsibility and
malpractice. It does not include such topics as attorney fees, client development, law
office economics, and practice systems except to the extent that professional responsibility
is directly discussed in connection with these topics.
[Vol. .58
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Before looking further at the court's definitional work, it would be useful to
consider some other perspectives on the meaning of legal ethics.
IV. THE MEANING OF LEGAL ETHICS
A. Legal Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Charles Wolfram observed that the term "legal ethics" is used in at least two
different ways. The first is as a description of the "so-called self-regulatory
system out of which the legal profession's codes emerge."4 s The second is "in
the quite different sense of applied moral philosophy in the field of legal
service."" Professors Deborah Rhode and David Luban have written that, in this
second, broader sense, legal ethics represents "a special case of ethics in general,
as ethics is understood in the central traditions of philosophy and religion." 7 In
this second, broader perspective, "legal ethics cuts more deeply than legal
regulation: it concerns the fundamentals of our moral lives as lawyers. As
Socrates noted about the subject of ethics, it 'is not about just any question, but
about the way one should live."' 4
According to this view, there is a connection between legal ethics and moral
philosophy; between legal ethics and questions of good and bad, right and
wrong. 9 Legal ethics, in this sense, is larger than a code of required conduct.
(4) Professionalism. Professionalism is knowledge and skill in the law faithfully
employed in the service of client and public good. It includes, but is not limited to,
courses on (a) the duties of attorneys to the judicial system, courts, public, clients, and
other attorneys, (b) competency, (c) pro bono, (d) the concept of a profession, (e) history
of the legal profession, (f) comparison of the legal profession in different nation's [sic]
systems of advocacy, and (g) jurisprudence of philosophy of law. Ethics sets forth the
standards ofprofessional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism includes what is
more broadly expected. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and In
addition to. the ethics CLE requirement....
State Bar of Georgia Directory and Handbook 104.H (1994-95) (emphasis added). The same
language appears in the 1996-97 Georgia Handbook. The Louisiana Committee on Professionalism
and Quality of Life was aware of the Georgia regulations at the time it was working on its proposals
for Louisiana. Telephone Conversation with Frank X. Neuner, Jr. (Sept 18, 1977). Some of the
language from the Georgia regulations seems to have been included in the Louisiana Supreme Court's
order of May 23, 1997.
45. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics v (1996).
46. Id.
47. Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 3 (1995).
48. Id. (quoting from Plato, The Republic of Plato 31 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968)).
49. See Ethics and the Legal Profession 23 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986).
The editors wrote:
As "moral philosophy," that is, the study of the norms that should guide the conduct of
rational agents, ethics is concerned with what makes acts right or wrong, good or bad,
virtuous or vicious, and with the reasons properly offered tojustify conduct. Ethics makes
explicit our understanding of norms, opening them to criticism and revision. Although
ethics cannot make people good, it can help people to see better what the good is.
1998)
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Such a code might well be a part of legal ethics, but it is not the end of it. Indeed,
it should be possible to evaluate the standards of such a code against the
underlying values of legal ethics.
B. Henry S. Drinker and Legal Ethics
In 1953, Henry S. Drinker published an influential book called Legal
Ethics." In the preface to the book he asked a basic question: "What... is
meant by Ethics, as applied to the legal profession?"" Drinker thought that it
was "impossible" to come up with an exact definition, but he accepted the view
that legal ethics represented a "branch of moral science,"" 2-- one that "treats of
the duties which a member of the legal profession owes to the public, the court,
to his professional brethren and to his client.""3 Drinker believed that many, but
not all, of the "principles governing the propriety of the lawyer's conduct" could
be found in statutes, court decisions, and the Canons of Ethics, but he thought it
might be all right to consider some standards of conduct as being outside the scope
of legal ethics. Mere "customs of the bar,""'4 he supposed, might be considered
"Legal Etiquette rather than Ethics.""3
Much of Drinker's book deals with the Canons of Ethics. But he did not
think that the Canons represented the entire substance of legal ethics. He saw
them as "a general guide""' that would be amended over time."' The Canons
were useful in the sense that a lawyer could avoid serious lapses in ethical conduct
if the lawyer studied the Canons carefully and "wholeheartedly respect[ed] and
abide[d] by their substance and spirit."' s But it was not enough for the lawyer
to "comply literally with the Canons":
The traditions of an honored profession bind him to a higher and
much more difficult duty....
The lawyer must not only be honest and upright, but must be
believed to be so by clients, courts, colleagues, and by his fellow citizens.
Id.
50. Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953).
51. Id. at xi.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Canon 25 states:
A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the Bar of a particular Court,
even when the law permits, without giving timely notice to the opposing counsel. As far
as possible, important agreements, affecting the rights of clients, should be reduced to
writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid performance of an agreement fairly made because
it is not reduced to writing, as required by rules of Court.
American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) [hereinafter "Canons of Ethics").
55. Drinker, supra note 50, at xi.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 58
N. GREGORY SMITH
Nor can he prove himself thus deserving of the confidence of the
community which he serves merely by observing scrupulously the letter
of the law. He must be recognized as one of those exponents of true
civilization who, by their lives, continually render "Obedience to the
Unenforceable"....
To maintain the position to which our traditions, our training, and
our duties and responsibilities entitle us, we lawyers must live and act in
the way which we know is right, irrespective of statutes, court decisions,
canons of ethics, and disbarment proceedings. 9
These are some of Drinker's thoughts on what lawyers should do, and be. He
said that these things were part of the lawyer's "duty." And he accepted a
definition of legal ethics that incorporates duties that lawyers owe. For Drinker
then, it appears that the expression "legal ethics" was a broad one indeed. It
apparently would include what is "expected" of lawyers, not just what is
"required." Indeed, Drinker's conception seems broad enough to cover a
considerable part of the territory that the Louisiana Supreme Court would now
fence in by professionalism. And it appears to cover more than that as well,
because it incorporates what is good, what is morally right.'°
It is not the purpose of this part of this article to contend that what Drinker
thought about "legal ethics" should be the only true way of thinking about it. At
this point, I want only to point out that his notion of legal ethics is quite different
from the one reflected in the Louisiana Supreme Court's order of May 23,
1997.6'
59. Id. at 3-4. In an article entitled "The Ethical Lawyer," Drinker elaborated on this point:
Obedience to the unenforceable is the true characteristic ofcivilization. It is this concept
which lawyers must constantly have before them if they are to be truly ethical. Concern
must be not with whether an act is subject to discipline by an ethics committee but
whether such behavior is that which the conscience directs.
Henry S. Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer, 7 U. Fla. L Rev. 375 (1954).
60. q'. George W. Warvelle, Essays in Legal Ethics 21 (1902):
It may be said, and with much truth, that a man called to the honorable position of an
advocate should exhibit, both in and out of his profession, the sterling qualities that
constitute the highest excellence of righteous living. But his is a duty incumbent on all
men, whatever may be their avocation or their position in society. The law does not
concern itself with moral duties, however much they may serve to influence legislation,
nor does legal ethics properly extend to individual character. It is upon this theory that
the present work has been constructed, and in the chapters that follow a consistent effort
has been made to confine the subject within its legitimate channel. The writer does not
assume to be a mentor nor to teach morals.
61. Nor do I mean to suggest that the Louisiana Supreme Court is the only institution or person
to have adopted the vision of "legal ethics" revealed in the order of May 23. Justice Harold U.
Clarke of Georgia has written: "(E]thics is a minimum standard which is required of all lawyers
while professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers." Harold G. Clarke, Professional-
ism, Repaying the Debt, in Teaching and Learning Professionalism, Symposium Proceedings, at 82
(ABA 1997).
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C. The Shrinking of Legal Ethics: From the Canons to the Rules
A number of commentators have written about the significanceof the changes
that have taken place, over time, in the profession's "codes." One of the principal
changes has been that the codes have moved from general statements of principle
to enforceable rules of conduct. Another way to say this is that the codes once
focused on what was expected of lawyers; now the Rules focus principally on
what is required, or prohibited. To some extent, the notion of "legal ethics"
reflected in the supreme court's order of May 23 mirrors this development.
1. The Canons
The American Bar Association promulgated the Canons of Ethics in 1908.62
They were adopted in Louisiana in 1910.63 The Preamble to the ABA Canons
indicated that they were intended to be more statements of principle than to
represent a comprehensive codification of disciplinary rules." Indeed, the
Canons had an aspirational or hortatory thrust, rather than a disciplinary focus.
For example, the Canons said that lawyers should have a "respectful attitude"
toward the courts;65 that it was "indecent" for a lawyer in trial to mention the
"personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of counsel";" that the "client cannot
be made the keeper of the lawyer's conscience";67 that the client has "no right to
demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive
personalities";" that it was "unprofessional and dishonorable" to be less than
candid in taking witness statements and in preparing affidavits;69 and that the
lawyer "should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity
of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of
justice."70 Canon 32 said that "a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved
62. Canons of Ethics, supra note 54. The Canons were not the first ethics code for American
lawyers. The Alabama State Bar Association had issued a Code of Ethics in 1887. The concepts
and language of the Canons owed much to the Alabama Code. See Wolfram, supra note 45, at 54
n.21. The Alabama Code, in turn, relied heavily on an Essay on Professional Ethics by George
Sharswood. Id. Sharswood's essay was first published in 1854. See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics
and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 Emory L.J. 909, 929 (1980).
63. See Louisiana Bar Association, 1910 Annual Report 208 (1910).
64. It stated:
The following canons of ethics are adopted by the American Bar Association as a general
guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the
existence of others equally imperative, though not specifically mentioned.
Preamble, Canons of Ethics, supra note 54.
65. See Canon i, Canons of Ethics.
66. See Canon 17, Canons of Ethics.
67. See Canon 18, Canons of Ethics.
68. See id.
69. See Canon 22, Canons of Ethics.
70. See Canon 29, Canons of Ethics.
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reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as
a patriotic and loyal citizen."'"
I have already noted that the Canons were thought to be more in the nature
of guidelines than hard-and-fast rules of conduct. These examples show that the
Canons also had a moralistic tone. They called upon lawyers to be honorable and
honest-people of conscience. They also called upon lawyers to be respectful and
courteous. With respect to the latter two qualities, we might say that the Canons
encouraged civility.
2. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1969.72 It was adopted, with some modifications, by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1970."3 Unlike the Canons, the
Model Code incorporated distinct rules that could be the basis of lawyer discipline.
At the same time, it expressly incorporated aspirational principles. Nonetheless,
the Code contemplated that the ultimate measure of lawyer honor was something
outside of the Code itself. The Preamble thus encouraged lawyers to seek the
"highest possible degrees of ethical conduct," but it acknowledged that "[e]ach
lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test
the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.'
The Model Code included Canons,75 Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
71. See Canon 32, Canons of Ethics.
72. American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) [hereinafter
"Model Code"].
73. See A. Leon Hebert, Professional Responsibility, 19 La. BJ. 199 (1971).
74. Preamble, Model Code.
75. Only nine in number, here is what the Canons said:
Canon I
A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal
Profession
Canon 2
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling its Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available
Canon 3
A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Canon 4
A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client
Canon 5
A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client
Canon 6
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently
Canon 7
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law
Canon 8
A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System
Canon 9
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Rules. These three things, said the Preliminary Statement to the Code, "define the
type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect." '76 But the three
were very different. The Canons were described as "statements of axiomatic
norms." 77 They expressed standards of conduct in very general terms. The
Ethical Considerations were much more specific, but were aspirational in
character. They were said to "represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive.""8 The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast
to the Ethical Considerations, were "mandatory in nature." They set forth "the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action. 79
The aspirational, and moral, dimensions of the Ethical Considerations can be
readily illustrated by a few examples. Among other things, the Ethical Consider-
ations said that a lawyer "should be temperate and dignified"; 80 "should refrain
from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct";"' "should find time to
participate in serving the disadvantaged";82 "should treat with consideration all
persons involved in the legal process";83 "should not engage in conduct that
offends the dignity and decorum" of judicial hearings;" "should be courteous to
opposing counsel"' s and "not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to
opposing counsel" in adversary proceedings." Some of the Ethical Consider-
ations included elements that are commonly wrapped up in the current label of
"professionalism." For example, EC 9-6 said that a lawyer "owes a solemn duty
to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect for the
law and for the courts and the judges thereof;. . . to act as a member of a learned
profession, one dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers
in supporting the organized bar.. .; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on
the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients
and of the public." It also said that the lawyer owes a solemn duty "to strive to
avoid not only professional impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety."
Many of the Ethical Considerations were reminiscent of statements in the
Canons. Although somewhat less moralistic in tone, they were even more overtly
aspirational, clearly dealing with what is expected rather than what is required.
Even more obviously than the expressions in the Canons, the Ethical Consider-
ations dealt with topics that many today would allocate to the subject of
A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety
76. See Preliminary Statement, Model Code.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See EC 1-5, Model Code.
81. See id.
82. See EC 2-25, Model Code.
83. See EC 7-10, Model Code.
84. See EC 7-36, Model Code.
85. See EC 7-38, Model Code.
86. See EC 7-37, Model Code.
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professionalism. But the Code described these expectations as ethical consider-
ations.
3. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were promulgatedby the American
Bar Association in 1983,87 and were adopted, with significant modifications, by
the Louisiana Supreme Court effective January 1, 1987.8 The Model Rules
represent a substantial departure from the earlier codes."9 Gone were the Canons.
Gone were the Ethical Considerations. There were a few aspirational statements
in the Preamble to the Model Rules, but the thrust of the Model Rules was
reflected in this statement from a preliminary section called "Scope": "Failure to
comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by the Rules is a basis for
invoking the disciplinary process." The Model Rules included "Comments," but
these were intended principally to explain and to illustrate "the meaning and
purpose of the Rule.""se The emphasis was on standards for invoking disci-
pline.9 '
The Model Rules actually do a bit more than define minimum levels of
performance, whose violation may result in discipline. The Scope section of the
Model Rules notes that some rules are "imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or
'shall not."' Violation of those rules could result in discipline. Still other rules,
"generally cast in the term 'may,' are permissive and define areas under the Rules
in which the lawyer has professional discretion." The Scope indicates that no
discipline should result for a choice that is within the bounds of such discretion.
87. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preface (ABA 1997) [hereinafter "Model
Rules"].
88. See Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, In La. R.S. tit. 37, Ch. 4 App., art. XVI,
Rules 1.1-8.5 (1988) [hereinafter "Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct"].
89. Why the change? There was dissatisfaction with the Model Code. Robert J. Kutak, who
chaired the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the
"Kutak Commission"), said that lawyers and scholars found the "three-part structure of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cumbersome and confusing." Robert J. Kutak, Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Why Do We Need Them?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 311, 311 (1983). One
of the problems here was that "when no Disciplinary Rule governed the facts at hand, courts were
increasingly reaching beyond those minimum standards and applying Canons and Ethical
Considerations as enforceable rules." Robert J. Kutak, How the New Ethics Code Will Affect Your
Law Practice, Banister, Fall 1981, at 5. In the context of making a similar point, Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., the reporter for the Kutak Commission, called the structure of the Model Code
"disastrous." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30
Clev. St. L. Rev. 571, 572 (1982). Hazard said that he supported continuance of the "aspirational
aims of the Canons and Ethical Considerations," but he thought it was a mistake to do so in the rules
themselves. Id.
90. Scope, Model Rules.
91. This is even more true in Louisiana than under the ABA's "model." When.the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct, it did not include the Preamble, the
Scope, or the Comments. See La. Rules of Professional Conduct. It adopted only the "rules"
themselves.
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Still other rules "define the nature of relationships betweenthe lawyer and others."
Finally, the Rules contemplate the existence of "moral and ethical considerations"
that are beyond the Rules themselves, and that those considerations should also
"inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by
legal rules."92
The Model Rules contemplate the existence of moral and ethical consider-
ations that are relevant to lawyer conduct, but give little attention to them.
Instead, the Rules focus on standards of conduct for disciplinary purposes. The
very nature of the Rules draws the attention of a reader to those minimum
standards of conduct. 93 For many lawyers, those standards are the universe of
"legal ethics." Given the nature of the Model Rules, it is not entirely surprising
that some might consider "legal ethics" to be equivalent to that which is required
of lawyers, under threat of discipline.
The profession has thus moved from codes that exhort lawyers to be good
people to a group of rules that tell lawyers what to do (or not to do) to avoid
punishment. In terms of the "codes" themselves, there could be said to have been
a shrinkage in the territory of legal ethics. Whatever their other virtues are, the
Model Rules seem to have come with a price. If codes are teachers (and I think
they are), the Model Rules have failed to teach lawyers very much about the
higher ideals of the legal profession. The professionalism "movement" itself may
be, at least in part, a response to that failure.94
V. ETHICS V. PROFESSIONALISM
We have already considered how the supreme court's order of May 23 did
something odd with the definition of "legal ethics." We now might observe that
the court's concept of legal ethics reflects the shrinkage of legal ethics that has just
been discussed. But that is not the whole story, because the court's order also says
that legal ethics includes legal malpractice. The court's order has placed an ethicq
label on something that is fairly far removed from traditional notions of ethics.
Why? It seems that "legal ethics" has had to pay the price for the uncertain
meaning of "professionalism." In order to require Louisiana lawyers to have a
discrete credit hour in professionalism, the court had to make some room for the
92. Scope, Model Rules.
93. Professor Stephen Gillers said that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct "impose few
significant duties on lawyers ... not already present in law." Stephen Gillers, What We Talked
About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243, 274
(1985).
94. Professor Cramton has observed:
(TJhe contemporary evolution of ethical codes into quasi-criminal rules of minimum
conduct largely abandons their role as a source of vocation or calling. The morality of
aspiration, central to professionalism, is eclipsed by the morality of duty. The recent
emphasis on lawyer oaths, creeds and civility resolutions is an appropriate effort to fill
this gap.
Cramton, supra note 6, at 10.
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new topic. It basically did so by defining legal ethics in an odd way and by saying
that professionalism starts where ethics leaves off."'
A. The May 23 Order and the Meaning of Professionalism
1. An Indistinct Line?
Of course, the court also endeavored to provide some specific content to the
word "professionalism." Unfortunately, the specificsgive rise to some difficulties.
That is because some of the topics that the court allocates to professionalism are
topics that are themselves subjects ofprovisions of the Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct. In short, it appears that the court has defined "professionalism" in a
way that picks up some things from the court's own concept of "legal ethics."
In particular, the court's order tells us that "professionalism" includes
"courses on the duties of attorneys to the judicial system, courts, public, clients,
and other attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations." In fact,
there are a number of duties on these topics set forth in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Many of those duties are "required," in the sense that their violation can
result in formal discipline. But if these same duties are picked up by the term
"professionalism," the line between"legal ethics" and "professionalism" becomes
rather indistinct. An indistinct line here would have troubling implications for the
practicability of the new rule.
2. Overlapping Duties
As the next few paragraphs show, it does not take much effort to find "duties"
in the Rules of Professional Conduct that seem to be covered by the court's
description of acceptable professionalism "courses."
With respectto duties to the judicial system, for example, the Louisiana Rules
of Professional Conduct provide, among other things, that "[a] lawyer shall not...
[s]eek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means
prohibited by law," 96 and that "[lt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to...
[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."'"
On the subject of respect to the courts, the Louisiana Rules provide, among
other things, that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... [m]ake a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal," "[flail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel," or "[o]ffer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false."'"
95. See Marvin L. Karp, Some Reflections on Change--and Professionalism, 24 The Brief 9,
76 (Summer 1995) ("[Pjrofessionalism' really picks up where 'ethics' leave off.").
96. La. Rules of Professional Conduct 3.5(a) (1988).
97. Id. Rule 8.4(d).
98. Id. Rule 3.3 (aX!), (a)(3), (aX4).
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The Louisiana Rules also contain duties that might be said to relate to the
public. For example, one rule provides that "[i]n the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly... [m]ake a false statement of material fact
or law to a third person."99 Another rule prohibits a lawyer from using "means
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person."'" And there are also rather detailed provisions dealing with advertising
and solicitation of clients.' The basic rule with respect to lawyer advertising
is that lawyers are not to make "false, misleading or deceptive communication[s]"
about their services. 2 This basic rule has an element of public protection about
it. Other rules that engage a duty to the public are discussed below in connection
with pro bono obligations.
The Rules of Professional Conduct set forth numerous obligations concerning
clients. These include an affirmative obligation to provide competent representa-
tion,"' a duty to represent clients "with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness,"1 4 a duty to keep the client "reasonably informed,"'0'  a duty of
confidentiality," ° a duty to safeguard client property in the lawyer's posses-
sion, 1 7 and a duty of loyalty that takes form in various rules on conflicts of
interest.'08
The Rules of Professional Conduct also include several duties relating to other
attorneys. We have already noted the existence of a rule that prohibits a lawyer
who represents a client from using means that "have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person."'" There is also a series of
rules on "Fairness to opposing party and counsel." These rules deal with
obstructing an opponent's access to evidence, falsifying evidence, making
frivolous discovery requests, and lack of diligence in complying with discovery
requests of an opponent." 0
Competency is the subject of the first of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 1. 1 provides, in part, that a "lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client."' The rule also says that "[c]ompetent representation requires the
99.' Id. Rule 4.1(a).
100. Id. Rule 4.4.
101. See Id. Rules 7.1, 7.2.
102. Id. Rule 7.1(a).
103. Id. Rule 1.1.
104. See id. Rule 1.3.
105. See id. Rule 1.4.
106. Id. Rule 1.6.
107. Id. Rule 1.15.
108. See id. Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12.
109. Id. Rule 4.4.
110. Id. Rule 3.4(a), (b), (d).
Ill. Id. Rule 1.1 (a). The Rule also requires lawyers to comply with mandatory CLE rules. Id.
Rule 1.1(b).
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legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."' 12
Finally, there is a rule about pro bono obligations, although it does not have
a mandatory nature. It provides that "[a] lawyer should render public interest legal
service," and it describes different ways in which the lawyer may do so."' A
separate rule also prohibits a lawyer from seeking "to avoid appointment by a
tribunal."" 1'
Most of the rules that are listed in the foregoing paragraphs are of a
mandatory nature-they say what is "required" of the lawyer."' To the extent
that they deal with what is "required," such rules would seem to fall within the
court's definition of "legal ethics." But the rules also concern subjects that the
court's order says are under the umbrella of professionalism. This seems to be a
problem.
3. Broader Expectations
Does this mean that the distinction that the court is attempting to draw
between "legal ethics" and "professionalism" is illusory? No. Even if the Rules
of Professional Conduct contain "disciplinary" rules on subjects that are thought
to come under the umbrella of professionalism, it is still possible to say more
about those subjects. In this connection, we should recall the statement in the May
23 order about professionalism including "what is more broadly expected." And
the court provides further relevant information in Regulation 4(b)(iv), which was
adopted as part of its May 23 order. That.regulation, which is quoted in full
above, identifies the following topics as eligible for professionalism credit: (1)
"the lawyer's responsibility as an officer of the court"; (2) "the lawyer's
responsibility to treat fellow lawyers, members of the bench, and clients with
respect and dignity"; (3) "misuse and abuse of discovery and litigation"; (4) "the
lawyer's responsibility to protect the image of the profession"; (5) "the lawyer's
responsibility generally to the public service"; and (6) "the lawyer's duty to be
informed about methods of dispute resolution and to counsel clients accordingly."
Even this list does not tell us how "attorney competency," something that the
supreme court includes in its catalog of professionalism "courses,"" 16 fits within
the court's own concept of professionalism." 7 And the list seems to incorporate
112. Id. Rule 1.1(a).
113. Id. Rule 6.1.
114. Id. Rule 6.2.
115. See supra authority cited in notes 96-114. The obvious exception is the pro bono rule.
It may be said to deal with what is "expected" rather than what is required. La. Rules of
Professional Conduct 6.1 (1988 & Supp. 1997).
116. See La. S. CL Order of May 23, 1977.
117. Competency is problematic as a professionalism topic because it is "required" by Rule 1.1
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, incompetent performance by an attorney may give
rise to malpractice liability. Malpractice liability, of course, is part of the court's definition of "legal
ethics."
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some things that are "required" of lawyers."' But the list also clearly incorpo-
rates expectations that go beyond what is disciplinable or sanctionable. For
example, relative to the duty of an attorney to the judicial system, a CLE speaker
might go beyond a discussion of behavior that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice and talk about opportunities for alternative dispute resolution. With
respect to the lawyer's duty to the court, it would be appropriate to develop what
it means to be an officer of the court. Regarding the lawyer's duty to clients and
other attorneys, a CLE speaker could refer to the responsibility to treat them with
civility and to avoid sharp practice in discovery and litigation. The new regulation
does not provide much help on the lawyer's duty to the "public," but it might be
appropriate here to focus on the positive aspects of accepting court appointments
and on the benefits of voluntary service in civic affairs." 9 Pro bono obligations
also seem relevant to public service, but the court listed those separately from the
duty to the public in amended Rule 3(c). In any event, Louisiana attorneys are not
"required" to perform pro bono service as such, so this would be a topic that
would clearly be appropriate for discussion in a professionalism presentation.120
In the end, though there are some areas of overlap, it is apparent that the court's
definition of "professionalism" has some content that is distinct from its definition
of "legal ethics."
VI. PRACTICAL CONCERNS: THE NEW RULE AND CLE PROGRAMS ON
PROFESSIONALISM
A. Overlap
There are a few practical concerns that arise from the court's order of May 23.
One of these relates to the problem of overlap. As explained above, even though
118. One example is the inclusion of the "lawyer's responsibility to treat" others "with respect
and dignity." The Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to "require" lawyers who
appear before them to be "patient, dignified, and courteous" to litigants, jurors, witnesses and
lawyers. See Canon 3(AX3), Code of Judicial Conduct, 8 La. R.S. (1991). To the extent that the
judge requires such conduct of a lawyer, such conduct may be thought to be "required," and not just
"expected."
Another example comes out of the discovery rules. Those rules require an attorney to certify that
discovery requests or responses are "[n]ot interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary or needless increase in the cost of litigation," and are "[n]ot unreasonable,
unduly burdensome, or expensive, given the needs of the case." La. Code Civ. P. art. 1420(BX2),
(B)(3). The rules might be said to "require" attorneys to avoid discovery abuses. An attorney who
violates the rules is subject to sanctions. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1420(D).
119. The court's May 23 order is probably most vague on this aspect of "professionalism."
Regulation 4.1(b)(iv), which was adopted in the court's order, merely refers to "the lawyer's
responsibility generally to the public service." This might well include pro bono service, of course,
but the court's order listed pro bono obligations separate from the lawyer's duties to the public. See
La. S. CL Order of May 23, 1997.
120. Rule 6.1 says that Louisiana lawyers "should" render "public interest legal service." La.
Rules of Professional Conduct 6.1 (1988).
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professionalism has content that is distinct from legal ethics, it appears that there
are some professionalism subjects that incorporate duties under the Rules of
Professional Conduct-duties that would also come within the court's definition
of legal ethics.' Would it be acceptable for a CLE speaker to talk about those
"incorporated"duties in a presentation on professionalism? Maybe not. However,
even if the court actually intends there to be no overlap between legal ethics and
professionalism, even if the court intends that a CLE presentation on "profession-
alism" deal only with conduct that is expected rather than required, it should be
anticipatedthat a speaker might at least refer to a corresponding requirement under
the Rules of Professional Conduct to give proper orientation to the presentation.
For example, a speaker might say, in discussing the expectationthat a lawyer treat
other lawyers with respect and dignity:
I will now talk about our duty as lawyers to treat each other with respect
and dignity. You are no doubt aware that the Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit us from using means, in representing our clients, that
"have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a
third person." Such conduct may be the subject of discipline. That's not
what I want to talk about today. Rather, I want to talk about some
broader issues related to our treatment of opposing counsel. Avoiding
discipline is one thing, but we can do better. And we should, because if
we treat opposing counsel with respect and dignity we will be showing
honor to an officer of the court, and to the system of justice itself.
Moreover, we will be providing better service for our clients in the long
run. As a practical matter, your opponent will be more likely to treat you
with dignity and respect if you behave in a professional manner yourself.
I have some examples to illustrate what I am talking about....
The speaker might even draw some examples from cases in which lawyers
were disciplined. However, the point would be to discuss the higher expectations
associatedwith treatment of opposing counsel, not minimal modes ofbehavior that
avoid discipline.
This sort of reference to the "rules" seems perfectly appropriate. One would
hope the Continuing Legal Education Committee would not be too pharisaical
about denying credit to programs on professionalism that acknowledge, or even
discuss, the fact that several of the topics identified with professionalism are
simply part of a continuum of conduct that incorporates disciplinary rules,
malpractice liability, criminal sanctions, and moral standards.
B. Ethics Lite
The supreme court's definition of legal ethics permits it to carve out a
separate sphere for professionalism that may be the principal focus of a CLE
121. See supra Section V(AX2).
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program. However, this does not mean that the average lawyer who attends a
CLE program will see a tremendous distinction between professionalism and what
he or she personally thinks of is "legal ethics." To the extent that the average
lawyer sees a distinction, however, it seems possible that he or she might obtain
the impression that one of the two required hours of CLE deals with "ethics" and
the other hour deals with "ethics lite."
ACLE program that emphasizes "more broadly expected" things should not
deal primarily with codified rules, with decisions of "ethics" committees, or with
cases involving discipline or malpractice liability. In contrast, such rules,
decisions, and cases are likely to receive substantial attention in a presentation on
"legal ethics." Another way to say this is that a presentation on legal ethics will
tend to deal, at least in part, with a type of law-what some have called "the law
of lawyering."' 22 Written materials on "legal ethics" could easily incorporate
rules, decisions, or cases. Written materials on professionalism would not be
likely to do so, and would probably appear to be "thinner" in comparison. As a
result, it is possible that CLE attendees may not be as serious about the hour of
professionalism as they are about the hour of legal ethics. However, if the
professionalism program is done well, and is interesting, this should not be a
serious problem.
C. Program Availability and Program Content
There are two potential problems that are more likely to arise in the early
years under the new rule than after the rule has been in place for a while. First,
it is likely that professionalism programs will be harder to find than programs on
legal ethics. CLE providers have a good deal of experience in setting up programs
whose contents, at least in part, come close to the new definition of "legal ethics."
They will have little or no experience with programs on professionalism. If the
result is fewer programs on professionalism, this could present hardships for
Louisiana lawyers, particularlyrural Louisiana lawyers, who are required to obtain
the new credit hour.
Second, it may be difficult to put together an effective CLE program on
professionalism. In part, this is a matter of inexperience. Because CLE providers
generally have not been offering programs on professionalism, they may not know
how to do that very well at the outset. But the problem is larger than that, because
it will probably be less obvious how or what to cover in a professionalism
program than it would be in a program on, say, family law. One thing that could
be brought up in a professionalism program is the Louisiana Code of Professional-
ism. 23 It certainly would be relevant. But a CLE speaker who spent much time
122. See. e.g., Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22 Washburn L. 413 (1983); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering I (2d ed. 1994).
123. The Code of Professionalism states:
My word is my bond. I will never intentionally mislead the court or other counsel. I will
not knowingly make statements of fact or law that are untrue.
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reading that code out loud to a group of Louisiana lawyers would probably not do
much for the cause of professionalism. Other approaches might include telling
"stories" about incivility, or civility; providing accounts of professional behavior
by great lawyers from the past or present; or making references to statistical data
on perceptions of incivility. There might be role-playing or other demonstrations
of appropriate or inappropriate behavior. Panel discussions might be offered.
Film clips might be shown. More creativity will probably be required for the
professionalism credit hour than for other CLE credit hours, but it should be
possible to offer programs on professionalism that are interesting and are of
reasonably good quality."" Even so, it would not be entirely surprising if some
lawyers come to think of professionalism programs as being somewhat
I
I will clearly identify for other counsel changes I have made in documents submitted
to me.
I will conduct myself with dignity, civility, courtesy and a sense of fair play.
I will not abuse or misuse the law, its procedures or the participants in the judicial
process.
I will consult with other counsel whenever scheduling procedures are required and will
be cooperative in scheduling discovery, hearings, the testimony of witnesses and in
the handling of the entire course of any legal matter.
I will not file or oppose pleadings, conduct discovery or utilize any course of conduct
for the purpose of undue delay or harassment of any other counsel or party. I will
allow counsel fair opportunity to respond and will grant reasonable requests for
extensions of time.
I will not engage in personal attacks on other counsel or the court. I will support my
profession's efforts to enforce its disciplinary rules and will not make unfounded
allegations of unethical conduct about other counsel.
I will not use the threat of sanctions as a litigation tactic.
I will cooperate with counsel and the court to reduce the cost of litigation and will
readily stipulate to all matters not in dispute.
I will be punctual in my communication with clients, other counsel and the court, and
in honoring scheduled appearances.
See Denise C. Redmann, Has the Golden Rule Tarnished? Put Professionalism Back Into the
Profession, 43 La. BJ. 370 (1995).
The Code originated in work by the Professionalism and Quality of Life Committee of the
Louisiana State Bar. It was approved by the Louisiana State Bar Association House of Delegates in
1991. It was approved by ihe Louisiana Supreme Court in 1992. See Id.; Neuner, supra note 6, at
20. More recently, on August 5, 1997, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a separate "Code of
Professionalism in the Courts." See La. S. Ct. Order of August 5, 1997.
124. The following suggestions emerged from some small group discussions at the October 1996
Symposium on Teaching and Learning Professionalism.
(TJhe talking heads approach doesn't work. Interactive programs that involve discussion
of vignettes are much more effective. To ensure a good group experience, be certain to
employ first-class teachers and teaching materials.
Teaching and Learning Professionalism, Symposium Proceedings, at 134 (ABA 1997).
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"preachy,"I2S somewhat light on substantive content, 26 and even somewhat
pointless. '
VII. HAVE WE LOST ANYTHING?
Finally, it would be well to consider a larger issue: Have we lost anything as
a result of the court's order of May 23? Does the limited scope of legal ethics that
is reflected in the order really matter very much if we now have a professionalism
concept that takes up where legal ethics leaves off?. Instead of losing anything,
maybe we have made a substantial gain. For most lawyers, legal ethics has come,
in practice, to have a somewhat limited meaning. They tend to think of legal
ethics as the things that are covered in the "rules." Now professionalism is
available to raise our sights to some of the ideals of the profession, perhaps to
some of the same ideals that used to be set forth in the Canons, and in the Model
Code, but that did not make it into the Model Rules. This is a gain, is it not?
It seems to me that the court's order involves both a potential gain and a
potential loss. The potential gain is the overtly aspirational promise of profession-
alism. If there is to be an improvement in civility, an improvement in respect for
125. Which is not to suggest that preaching is a bad thing. Ministers of religion do a fair
amount of this, often with good results. If the profession hopes to improve the behavior of its
lawyers, a little preaching might be helpful.
126. One observer has noted:
[Tihe focus of much of the current wave of professionalism is really on civility-how you
treat your opponent, your client and the court. Civility is nothing more or less than
common courtesy and decency in dealing with others. The Virginia Bar Association's
Creed defines it as follows:
Courtesy is neither a relic of the past nor a sign of less than fully committed
advocacy. Courtesy is simply the mechanism by which lawyers can deal with daily
conflict without damaging their relationships with their fellow lawyers and their own
well-being.
Not a bad definition, but neither does it require an annual hour of CLE to become
ingrained in our professional conduct. In fact the Louisiana Code of Professionalism
could be committed to memory in a fraction of that time.
Phillip A. Wittmann, Should "Professionalism" Be Mandatory? Can Civility Be Taught?, 45 La.
B.J. 19, 23 (1997) (footnote omitted).
127. One complaint here might be that professionalism cannot be taught. On that point, the
President of the Louisiana State Bar Association recently said: "I disagree. I believe that
professionalism can be taught, professionalism can be reinforced, and professionalism should be the
practice of all members of the bar." One on One, The New LSBA President Discusses Pro Bono,
Professionalism, Projects and Plans, 45 La. B.J. 13, 15 (1997) (interview of David Bienvenu).
A larger question here, of course, is whether mandatory continuing legal education does any good
at all. At least some commentators have raised questions about the effectiveness of mandatory CLE
programs. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Md. L. Rev. 274,
291 (1986) ("[S]urely it is not self-evident that requiring passive attendance at a few intermittent
lectures will have substantial effects."); Paul A. Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent,
61 A.B.A. J. 574, 576 (1975) ("What may likely come about is that ten or fifteen hours a year of
required professional education for all will entail big business for some continuing legal education
entities, rote programming for others, and an exercise in frustration for most.").
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the legal system, an improvement in public service by lawyers, and in the other
values that may be incorporated into professionalism, some continuing legal
education on those topics could be helpful. The potential loss, however, is
troubling. Professionalism may incorporate a number of professional values, but
it is not clear that it incorporates "legal ethics" in its broader sense.' It is not
clear that professionalism is concerned with larger matters of right and wrong,
good and evil." 9 On the other hand, the very expression "legal ethics"-vague
though it may be-seems to be concerned, at least in part, with those matters. But
the court's order of May 23 serves up a concept of legal ethics that is too limited
to incorporate them. It seems to me that if we are ultimately concerned about
lawyer behavior, and if we believe that continuing legal education can help, it is
a mistake to take questions of right and wrong, good and evil, out of the
curriculum." °
To be sure, there are disagreements about fundamental questions of morality.
But that does not mean that moral questions should not even be considered. They
are among the most important questions that there are.
An illustration may be in order. In Spaulding v. Zimmerman, "' some
defense lawyers ran into an "ethical" issue. They represented the defendants in a
personal injury action brought by the father and natural guardian of David
Spaulding, a young man who had been severely injured in an automobile accident.
As is customary in such litigation, David was examined by a physician who had
been hired by the defendants. This physician, a neurologist named Hannah,
noticed something that had eluded David's own doctors: the young man was
suffering from a potentially life-threatening aneurysm of the aorta. Dr. Hannah
128. Indeed, the court's order of May 23 strives diligently to make a distinction between legal
ethics and professionalism.
129. Professor Cramton has argued that a "fully adequate conception of professionalism... rests
upon a morality transcending any professional role or traditions." Cramton, supra note 6, at 18.
However, he has also observed that there is disagreement about the meaning of professionalism, that
it has several "false faces," and that the profession as a whole "cannot agree on matters of
foundational truth." Id. at 7, 14, 18.
Timothy P. Terrell and James H. Wildman wrote: "Recent attempts to define the demands of legal
professionalism have often been unsatisfactory because they reflect one of two extremes. One
reduces professionalism to the level of professional etiquette-pleasantness, returning phone calls,
and the like-so that it appears to lack any real moral content at all. The other vehemently gives
professionalism moral content, but reduces it to a single, politically biased value-helping the poor."
Terrell & Wildman, supra note 17, at 419.
130. Cf. Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 823,
851 (1996) ("if we avoid using words such as ethical, professional, right,'wrong, and truth, we send
a message that those concepts are irrelevant to the enterprise.") (Professor Myers was writing about
law school education at this point).
Professor Robert Cochran has observed: "It may be that the problem in the legal profession is not
too little attention to rules, but too little attention to character." Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and
Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society and Anthony T Kronman's The Lost Lawyer:
Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 707, 707 (1996).
131. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
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did not know whether the aneurysm had developed in consequence of the accident,
but the neurologist wrote a report to defense counsel about it. Dr. Hannah wrote
that the aneurysm was "[t]he one feature of the case which bothers me more than
any other.'P
132
Defense counsel did not tell David, his father, or opposing counsel about the
aneurysm. Why? It would have changed the settlement calculus. And the case
did settle-for $6500. Later, when David took an army reserve physical, he
learnedof the aneurysm, andbrought a successful motion to reopenthe settlement.
The trial court said that "when the parties were in an adversary relationship, no
rule required or duty rested upon defendants to disclose" the aneurysm; however,
defendants "must be here charged with knowing, that plaintiff under all the
circumstances would not accept the sum of $6500.00 if he or his representatives
knew of the aneurysm and its possible serious consequences."' Defendants
appealed the decision to reopen the settlement, but they lost. In its opinion
affirming the decision of the trial court, the Minnesota Supreme Court said that
"[w]hile no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required" defense counsel
to tell David about the aneurysm, it was obvious that the earlier settlement had not
taken the aneurysm into account."'
Should defense counsel have told David about the aneurysm? The "canon of
ethics" may not have required them to do so. Indeed, absent client consent to
disclosure, the confidentiality rules would have pointed to a "no" answer to the
disclosure question. But moral considerations, ethical considerations, would have
pointed to a "yes.""' The case presented not just a question under the "rules,"
but also a question of right and wrong. Is it appropriate to consider such moral
questions under the rubric of "legal ethics"? I think it should be. But I do not see
room for such considerations under the concept of "legal ethics" reflected in the
May 23 order. I question the wisdom of teaching a version of legal ethics that is
limited to malpractice and things that are "required" of lawyers. This is a version
of ethics that is divorced from its larger ethical moorings.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Supreme Court has given Louisiana lawyers an annual
opportunity to hear about something called "professionalism" as part of their
mandatory continuing legal education obligations. The court also wants Louisiana
132. Id. at 707.
133. Id. at 709.
134. Id. at 710.
135. Other considerations also pointed in favor of disclosure. First, there was the risk (actually
realized) that the settlement could be set aside. Second, there was a risk of tort liability for the
nondisclosure. The general rule in tort is that a stranger has no duty to rescue someone else from
danger. However, an exception to this rule arises when the defendant's own negligence places the
plaintiff in danger. In that situation, tort law imposes a duty to give assistance and to avoid further
harm. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 375-77 (5th ed. 1984).
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lawyers to have an annual hour of CLE credit in "legal ethics." To achieve its
purposes, the court issued an order that seeks to distinguish "professionalism"
from "legal ethics." The result is an odd definition of "legal ethics," a definition
of "professionalism" that seems to overlap with "legal ethics" in some respects,
and some uncertainty about the substantive content of "professionalism."
To the extent that human behavior can be positively influenced by "teach-
ers,"'' the court's order of May 23 should contribute to an increase in
professionalism among members of the bar. That would be good. My principal
concern with the court's order is that it does injury to the notion of "legal ethics."
In its broadest sense, legal ethics has been thought to deal with more than minimal
standards of conduct, with more than things that lawyers must do, or not do, to
avoid punishment. Legal ethics has also been thought to deal with what is right.
But that is not the concept of legal ethics reflected in the court's order. The
court's concept of legal ethics, the concept that it wants all Louisiana lawyers to
hear about every year, is limited to legal malpractice and standards of required
conduct. This is a loss.
Does the new professionalism hour make up for that loss? That is not
apparent from the court's order. Unfortunately, professionalism remains a rather
uncertain term, with an uncertain meaning. It is not clear at all that it incorporates
fundamental considerations of right and wrong. If it does not, I think the May 23
order represents a wrong turn for the profession.
136. i think it can.
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